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1On September 16th-17th 2017, a group of scholars and activists2 organised 
a discussion on the controversial events which took place in 1965-1966 in 
Indonesia: the abduction and murder of top-military figures, which led to the 
massacre of hundreds of thousands of people, most of them associated with 
the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, others staunch supporters of President 
Soekarno.3 The PKI was banned thereafter. The new president Suharto 
established the repressive New Order regime. The 2017 gathering was one 
more in a series, as many have been held since 1998, when the new political 
regime began to allow free speech. The main organiser was the Forum 1965, 
an umbrella association of various organisations of victims of this genocide.4 
Co-organisers were members of the International People’s Tribunal 1965, a 
foundation which had organised a People’s Tribunal in 2015 in The Hague, 
which had concluded that the Indonesian State should be held responsible for 
the post-1965 massacres, and that these killings amounted to genocide. The 
1. Emeritus professor, Gender and Women’s Same-sex Relations Crossculturally, Amsterdam 
University.
2. Invited were well known researchers such as Professor Dr Asvi Warman Adam, Dr Baskara 
Wardaya, Dr Kusnanto Anggoro, Dr Abdul Wahid and others, as well as some of the country’s 
best known human rights lawyers including Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Todung Mulya 
Lubis.
3. A shorter and slightly different version appeared in Inside Indonesia November 3, 2017. 
http://www.insideindonesia.org/when-a-history-seminar-becomes-toxic.
4. As I will explain below, the use of the word genocide is justified by the conclusion of the 
Panel of Judges of the IPT 1965 in July 2016 and published in 2017.
SaSkia E. WiEringa1
When a History Seminar Becomes Toxic: A Reading of 
the Attack on LBH Jakarta in September 2017 
196 Saskia E. Wieringa
Archipel 95, Paris, 2018
venue for the seminar was the office of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation in 
Jakarta (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI). It was to be a 
modest, closed symposium for which—as it was held inside an office, and with 
less than 50 participants—no permit was needed. Such seminars are regularly 
held in the YLBHI office without any problem. But this seminar turned toxic.
The preparations for the seminar had come to the attention of some groups 
with a vested interest in maintaining the New Order version of this tragedy and 
they planned to disrupt it. The evening before the date of the seminar, Rahmat 
Himran, coordinator of the Anti Communist Students’ and Youth Alliance 
(Aliansi Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Anti Komunis) had met with retired general 
Kivlan Zen and representatives of several radical Muslim militia including the 
PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Students’ 
Organisation). They decided to break apart the seminar.5 They contacted the 
police and asked them to prohibit the meeting.6 When on the morning of 
September 16, 2017, the first participants arrived at the seminar venue they 
found it barricaded by the police. They were not allowed to enter the office. The 
survivors of the genocide, in their 80s and many in poor health, had to wait and 
stand outside in the sun while negotiations were carried out. Eventually the staff 
was allowed to bring some plastic chairs outside so the elderly could sit. Outside 
the gate, members of the PMII, the Laskar Merah Putih (Red White Militia) 
and GP Ansor (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, Ansor Youth Movement) had gathered, 
shouting out slogans to eliminate the PKI and to dissolve this seminar which, 
they asserted, was meant to revive the banned PKI. They were well prepared, 
carrying banners, the attributes of their respective organisations and their 
uniforms. They had also come equipped with a van complete with megaphones 
and loudspeakers. This mob had come from a demonstration against the crimes 
against humanity committed by the Myanmarese government against the 
Rohingyas. The politician Amien Rais (of the conservative Muslim Party PAN) 
had not only held forth on the situation in Myanmar, he had also called for a 
jihad against the so-called revival of the PKI.7
5. https://tirto.id/rapat-sebelum-menyerbu-gedung-ylbhi-cwSG. see also http://www.suaraislam.
co/inilah-sosok-rahmat-himran-korlap-penyerang-ylbhi-korlap-gerakan-tangkap-ahok/
6. Rahmat Himran is also a leader of the so called 313 militia, an organisation set up in 
2016 to make the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, usually called Ahok, step 
down. They organised a mass rally on 31 March 2016, the start of a campaign of mass 
demonstrations that eventually saw the governor imprisoned on a charge of blasphemy, 
losing his campaign for re-election to his Muslim rival. Rahmat Himran had also been in 
the forefront of the virulent anti-LGBT campaign which erupted late 2015. See https://news.
detik.com/berita/d-3650087/koordinator-aksi-di-lbh-sempat-dikabarkan-hilang-. For his long 
involvement in the campaign against the LGBT community: see http://nasional.harianterbit.
com/nasional/2016/02/25/57556/86/40/Sebarkan-Kelainan-Komunitas-LGBT-Bisa-Kena-
Sanksi-Penjara. For an analysis of how the anti-communist and anti-LGBT campaigns are 
connected, see Wieringa 2017. 
7. https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3645929/amien-rais-bicara-cebong-dan-pki-di-aksi-bela-
rohingya. Ironically the chair of the YLBHI foundation and general coordinator of the IPT 1965, 
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The police explained to the organisers that the meeting had to be dissolved 
as it didn’t have a permit. Human rights lawyers of the YLBHI argued with 
the police that this constituted a violation of the right of assembly and of 
freedom of expression, and that by law no permit was needed for this closed, 
small seminar. The demonstrators outside shouted “Allah is great” and 
“eliminate the PKI,” the slogans also heard during the mass demonstrations 
in 1966, which had been taking place while the genocide was unfolding, 
both justifying the violence and inciting vigilante groups to participate in the 
riots, mass arrests and massacres. The old victims patiently sitting outside 
the building had heard it all before. The slogans, the brutality of a mob set 
loose. A reminder of the violence experienced 50 years ago. Yet even under 
Suharto, an attack like this one had never occurred. The YLBHI building 
has always been a safe space, where people could discuss issues freely. The 
question is therefore: what allowed this sabotage to happen? An attention to 
a strict chronology of the facts and a review of the distinct groups and figures 
involved shed some light on the issue. It clearly appears that the continued 
wilful misrepresentation of the events surrounding 1965-1966 allows the old 
mechanism of rumours—renamed hoaxes—to be operative. What remains 
to be answered is the meaning to grant to this attack, which is far from an 
isolated case, for Indonesian politics.
The well-known events: a reminder
The period 1965-66 in Indonesia was a troubled one. On October 1st 1965, 
six generals and one lieutenant (by mistake) were murdered. A genocide 
followed with estimates ranging from 300,000 to one million victims, while 
hundreds of thousands were taken prisoner under inhuman circumstances or 
set to work in forced labour camps.8 Under great pressure from right-wing 
students, President Soekarno was removed. General Suharto replaced him, 
heading up a repressive military dictatorship for 32 years, which he called 
the New Order. Increasingly attacked by students and human rights activists 
he was forced to step down during the economic crisis of 1998. A period of 
democracy followed, called Reformasi. But the all-powerful military never 
lost control over the reins of the state, though they stepped aside to allow 
Indonesia to present a less repressive face to the outer world.
Who murdered the generals on October 1st, 1965? The actual murderers 
are known, middle-ranking officers of the same army. They have all been 
tried, apart from the lieutenant who headed the abduction squad and who saw 
Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, was about to depart to join the panel of judges of the Permanent 
People’s Tribunal on the Rohingyas, in Kuala Lumpur.
8. In the First comprehensive study on the mass murders, Cribb (1990), concludes possibly 
500,000 people were murdered. The Final Report (2016 published in 2017) by the IPT 1965 
follows this estimate. Other reports mention different figures.
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to it that all generals were killed. He has mysteriously disappeared. But who 
ordered him to kill the generals? And who organised this affair? And why? 
The organising group called themselves the September 30th Movement (in 
Indonesian, Gerakan 30 September, G30S). They declared they just wanted 
to abduct the army’s top brass and bring them before President Soekarno, 
as they had understood these generals planned a coup against the President 
in the coming days. Perhaps an unusual way to deal with political matters, 
but not uncommon in Indonesia. The President himself had been abducted 
by eager youth to force him to proclaim independence. But then why were 
the generals murdered? For when he heard that news Soekarno became angry 
and refused all support.9 With their murders the G30S group signed their own 
death warrants, and ensured that, in view of the very limited support they had, 
their movement headed towards a sure defeat. 
General Suharto, who was not murdered, though he was a high enough general 
to have appeared on the list, quickly subdued the small rebellious units. He 
immediately blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) for masterminding a 
‘coup’ and set about eliminating the PKI. Muslim and Catholic mass organisations10, 
which had long been antagonistic towards the growing influence of the PKI, were 
trained and drummed up to demonstrate against leftist organisations and President 
Soekarno. Students were mobilised by the army and a conservative Catholic group 
led by a Jesuit priest. These demonstrations turned violent and under the pretext of 
restoring order General Suharto managed to wrest the presidency from Soekarno. 
In the meantime, he had mounted a propaganda campaign in which the PKI was 
painted as a-religious group, ‘always already’ traitors to the Nation, who had used 
the Gerwani organisation to train their women members to engage in sex orgies. 
In such an orgy, young girls who happened to be present at the site where the 
generals were killed would supposedly have seduced and castrated them. They 
were also alleged to have sung a popular song about a special kind of weed, 
Genjer-genjer. These lies were repeated throughout the New Order and became the 
official version of this period, endlessly repeated in school books and the media.11 
In 1984, a propaganda film (‘Pengkhianatan G30S/ PKI’, ‘The Betrayal of the 




9. There is a lot of literature on these events. The most well known analysis of the September 
30th Movement is Roosa (2006). On the mass violence that followed it see for instance Kammen 
and McGregor (2012).
10. Interestingly, a conservative Catholic group, guided by the Jesuit priest Father Beek had 
been particularly active in the first stages of mobilisation. The former student leader Wanandi 
provides an illuminating inside account of the Catholic student movement which had prepared 
itself long in advance with printing presses and safe houses (Wanandi 2012:189).
11. See Wieringa (2002) for an account of the slander against Gerwani. 
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and in which Suharto was portrayed as a hero and Soekarno as a traitor, the army 
as trustworthy, and rival units like the Air Force as complicit. This bloody film was 
compulsory viewing for generations of school children, until 1998.12
State-sponsored narration: its deconstruction and the recent political answer
In the meantime, both foreign and national researchers exposed the lies. 
The autopsy, which turned out to be signed by Suharto, was made available to 
the public decades ago. It showed no marks of castration.13 The stories told by 
the girls themselves (who were never tried, though they were all imprisoned) 
also made clear that there had been no orgy. Although a few leaders of the 
PKI had known of and supported the G30S group, the party as a whole had 
been totally unprepared and caught unaware. It was revealed that Suharto had 
known of the plans to abduct the generals and had done nothing to protect his 
colleagues. There have also been suggestions that he was behind the G30S 
group or at least may have promised them support. Soekarno was even accused 
of having planned the coup against himself, although this accusation defies all 
logic.14 In short, there is a lot of unclarity and confusion about this crucial 
period in Indonesian history, which has left such deep scars on the nation. 
This has not prevented the army chief of staff, General Gatot Nurmantyo, 
from ordering that the notorious propaganda film ‘The Betrayal of G30S/
PKI’ be shown again both for the army and for the millennial generation, 
to teach them about history.15 It is this film that contains the scene showing 
alleged Gerwani members happily dancing nakedly the dance of the “fragrant 
Flowers,” singing the song Genjer-genjer, castrating the generals and gouging 
out their eyes. The film also “proved” that the PKI planned to betray the nation, 
and that the Air Force and President Soekarno were complicit. The army and 
General Suharto on the other hand were presented as heroes.16 Also, this film 
has not been shown since 1998 because the Air Force had protested against the 
way they were portrayed in the film.
In a recent television programme, Sukmawati Sukarnoputri reminisced 
about a discussion she had had with the producer of the propaganda film, 
Arifin C. Noer. He had acknowledged that the film had been ordered and paid 
for by the army, which had kept close control on the production process. He 
was well aware that many scenes contained historical distortions.17 
12. See McGregor (2007) for how the military wrote its own history on this period.
13. See Anderson (1987).
14. For the interviews with the girls see Wieringa (2002). For the various versions of what 
happened, see Roosa (2006) and Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2018 forthcoming).
15. http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/09/18/owh1q2354-nobar-film-
g30spki-panglima-tni-perintah-saya-mau-apa
16. See for instance McGregor (2007) for an analysis of this film.
17. As told by Sukmawati in the TVOne programme ILC Indonesia Lawyer´s Club on 19 
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Islamist politicians such as Amien Rais of PAN and lawmakers of Golkar 
and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sosial, Social Justice Party) recently chimed in to 
support the showing of the film.18 On social media images appeared of the 
FPI and other militias such as the group Bang Japar of the hate-mongering 
Senator Fahira Idris and her supporters  who organised showings of the film.19 
However, protests remain against the army chief’s plans to widely screen the 
movie again. The NU is rejecting the directive, and the Ministry of Education 
does not want school children to be exposed to this film again.20
The president has chosen to take an ambiguous position. While he voiced 
his support for the showing of a film on the 1965 period, suggesting a new film, 
better suited to the needs of the present generation, should be produced,21he 
attended the screening of the “Betrayal of the G30S/PKI,” in the presence 
of general Gatot Nurmantyo.22 The Director General for Education, well 
known historian and former human rights activist Hilmar Farid, seized on the 
occasion. He said it was an excellent idea indeed, a new film must be made, 
which should incorporate recent historical findings. While this announces a 
possible political battle, several films are already available which portray the 
period in a different light from the army propaganda film. The lies on Gerwani 
are refuted in the film “The Women and the Generals” (2010) by Swedish 
filmmaker Maj Wechselmann, and the two documentaries produced by Joshua 
Oppenheimer—“The Act of Killing” (2012) and “The Look of Silence” 
(2014) could be widely screened (and the ban on The Look of Silence lifted) as 
suggested by the lawmaker Eva Sundari.23 
On social media (opini.id), a short video was uploaded immediately 
suggesting what this new film might contain. A well-known scene from the 
original propaganda film, in which PKI leaders are shown allegedly planning 




19. See https://sketsanews.com/news/fahira-idris-hukum-tegas-lgbt/ Fahira Idris is well known 
for her virulent hate speech regarding LGBT organisations. This group also joined the attack 
on the YLBHI building.
20. http://www.suratkabar.id/53169/news/pbnu-anggap-film-g30spki-adalah-propaganda-
dan-tak-cocok-diputar-saat-ini and https://www.tempo.co/read/news/2017/09/17/078909929/
tni-ajak-tonton-film-g-30s-pki-pbnu-tak-cocok-diputar-sekarang Menteri Pendidikan juga 
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discussing the marriage of a popular singer, Raisa Andriana, and the leaders 
are told to watch infotainment news so as to be better informed. This is of 
course a nice but bitter—for powerless—parody. 
The opposed voices of the Muslim groups
During the negotiations with the police, activists alerted the chair of 
the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) youth movement, GP Ansor, Gus Yaqut. He 
immediately called back its members for he had not authorised them to join 
the demonstrations. This is an interesting development, for members of GP 
Ansor and its militant unit, Banser, had participated in the mass killings in 
1965-66. At the moment however, the moderate Muslim mass organisation 
NU is engaged in a struggle against radical Muslim groups which have more 
and more influence on a large part of the Muslim population. These last groups 
operate via front organisations such as the PMII. The NU, a large organisation 
with millions of members, includes progressive groups such as Gusdurian, 
consisting of young progressive Muslim scholars.24 
The secretary general of the GP Ansor, Abdul Rochman, issued a statement 
that said that GP Ansor wanted the truth out and supported a seminar like the one 
organised. A related group JIAD (Jaringan Islam Anti Diskriminasi, Muslim 
Anti-Discrimination Network) also released a message, stating that to speak 
the truth about the 1965-66 genocide will liberate the people from the shackles 
of the past. Another statement of support came from the HMI (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam) branch of Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta.25 Later, to 
show their solidarity with the embattled human rights defenders, members of 
GP Ansor as well as KOKAM, the youth organisation of the Muhammadiyah 
and many other organisations which are assisted by lawyers of the LBH, such 
as those of paralegals and domestic workers, helped clean up the debris of the 
attack on the YLBHI building.26
24. The name refers to Gus Dur, or Abdurrahman Wahid, the country’s fourth President and the 
only one so far to search for a way to find justice for the survivors of the 1965 genocide. He 
was a very influential leader of the NU. Durian is the name of a fruit with a hard prickly shell, 
a foul smell and a sweet taste.
25. http://hmifisipolugm.or.id/rilis-sikap-hmi-komisariat-fisipol-ugm-mengecam-pembubaran-
seminar-dan-penyerangan-di-lbh-ylbhi-jakarta/. This is also noteworthy, for before 1965 the 
HMI and the student organisation associated with the PKI, the CGMI, often clashed. 
26. KOKAM is the abbreviation of “Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda” (Resilience 
Command of the Muhammadyah Youth). It is striking that this militant youth group which 
often operates in smart military-style uniforms is now engaged in such a peaceful activity, 
as can be seen in their support of a human rights organisation that also helps 1965 victims. 
So far they have usually been associated with attacks on 1965 victims. Apparently they have 
shifted gears in the wake of the polemics between the traditional, so-called moderate Muslim 
mass organisations such as the NU and Muhammadyah and the Islamist, neo-Salafist groups 
such as HTI, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This sudden shift, by the way, also indicates the control 
of the central leadership over their members. Whether they attack or clean up, these are no 
spontaneous actions. 
Finally, the participants were allowed in. Yet in the afternoon police 
stormed the building after all, rushing right up to the 4th floor, under the 
pretext they had understood the seminar was underway despite the fact it had 
been prohibited. Their suspicion was aroused when the elderly survivors had 
returned to the building around 3 pm. They had been evacuated to a safe place 
but as they had come from all over Indonesia they wanted to evaluate the event. 
The police were however still swarming all over the grounds and decided to 
attack. They did not act on their own initiative, though. Apparently Kivlan Zen 
and his associates had received information about the discussions inside the 
building. At least during the television programme the “Indonesia Lawyers” 
Club’ on 19 September he waved his mobile phone, saying “I may be retired, 
but I get enough intelligence.” The participants were forcibly dispersed by the 
police, who took the banner and documents as proof. 
On Saturday evening indignant activists sent out messages denouncing 
what they called the “emergency of democracy” and called for activists and 
artists to join them the next day at 10 in the morning to celebrate a cultural 
festival of free speech, Asik Asik Aksi.27 Some 200 people eventually came, 
including singers, poets and musicians. If we cannot speak the truth, we will 
celebrate it through art, was the message.
By the beginning of the evening of Sunday 17 September, when the 
art fair was over and the participants wanted to go home, all of a sudden, 
demonstrators entered the grounds and filled the streets around the building 
of the YLBHI. It turned out that a hoax had been circulating on social media, 
conveying the message that a PKI meeting was going on after all and that 
they were singing the song Genjer-genjer.28 The ca. 1000 aggressive protesters 
shouted slogans like “long live the army,” “disband the PKI,” “it is allowed 
by Islam to drink their blood,” “burn them alive,” “Allah is great.”29 This 
time, the protesters  included members from the large militias of the FBR 
(Forum Betawi Rempug, Betawi Brotherhood Forum), and the FPI (Forum 
Pembela Islam, Islam Defenders’ Front) as well as from the smaller Majelis 
Rasulullah.30 These very well-organised vigilante groups are well-funded, 
equipped, trained, and known for their violence.31 They had been mobilised 
via their whatsapp groups and other forms of social media.
27. A play with words, Asik or Asyik means passionate and is an anagram of Aksi.
28. https://tirto.id/hoax-pki-penyerbuan-dan-kericuhan-senin-dini-hari-di-ylbhi-cwSW
29. There were also specific calls with pictures of particular activists, with calls to burn them 
alive. For security reasons I do not provide their names.
30. The FBR is a militia which combines cultural activities of the Betawi group with vigilante 
actions. The FPI is a hardliner Muslim militia known for its attacks on minority groups. The 
Majelis Rasulullah.is a youth group, mostly known for the spreading of ultraconservative 
Islamist teaching.
31. See also: https://tirto.id/dari-mana-1000-an-orang-yang-mengepung-lbh-jakarta-cwT9
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They tried to storm the building. This time the police had to protect the 
participants. They explained to the protesters this was no PKI seminar, only a 
cultural festival. They denied the song Genjer-genjer was sung.32 To no avail. 
The protests grew increasingly violent. Stones and bottles were hurled at the 
police and at the building, injuring officers and smashing the windows. Inside 
the building the participants barricaded the doors with chairs and desks. The 
gate was damaged, the grounds were trampled, doors ruined. The police used 
tear gas and water cannons to sweep the streets clear, but the protesters kept 
coming. Finally, after midnight it was possible to evacuate the first festival 
participants in police buses; by three o’clock in the morning the last convoy 
of buses left the premises. They were followed by aggressive youths on 
motorbikes all the way to the grounds of the National Human Rights Office, 
where the participants were safe, and from whence they were finally able to 
regain their homes. Only 22 violent protesters were arrested.
Post-truth? Hoaxes as political manipulation
Shifts in power constellations often create the need to engineer historical 
“facts,” called black propaganda, and are usually accompanied by hate speech, 
to support the rise of a new victorious group.33 The most conspicuous form of 
such manipulation in Indonesian modern history is the use of the song Genjer-
genjer and the portrayal in army propaganda of naked dancing girls castrating 
the country’s top brass. This image is repeated, again and again, to justify 
the genocide in 1965-66 and the continued persecution and stigmatisation of 
supporters of President Soekarno and the PKI. It is still effective 52 years after 
it was conjured up, as discussed above. But who are the present-day targets? 
It has become a little difficult to see any danger in the timid, frail, poorly-
dressed octogenarians, who are the survivors of the massacres and army 
prison camps and the militias which assisted them. The new scapegoats are 
human rights defenders. In social media, messages appeared during the attack 
on the YLBHI office which read “YLBHI is the nest of the PKI.” Pictures 
were disseminated of discussion participants inside the building, over which a 
hammer and sickle and the letters PKI were pasted, everything dripping with 
blood. The PKI scare is kept very much alive. But for what purposes?
Hardliner Muslim organisations employ the bogeyman of a communist 
revival to keep their supporters literally boiling with anger. Before you know it, 
so the message goes, these activists are singing Genjer-genjer and the Gerwani 
witches may start castrating again. The power of such a simple and melodious 
32. One of the protesters called to a female participant of the art fair: “Hey, cadaver (bangke), 
devil. If you are true then you undress.” A clear reference to the slander against Gerwani which 
is still, 52 years after it was invented, used to incite hatred (see reference on Gerwani above). 
33. See Timmermann (2005), Welch (2014) and (2015).
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song seems rather exaggerated.34 Yet the police and the YLBHI staff had to 
repeat again and again that this song was not sung during the cultural festival. 
Instead participants sang Indonesia Raya and songs by the band Banda Neira, 
its lead singer Ananda Badudu bravely continuing to sing when the windows 
began to be pelted with stones in order to comfort the panicking audience. 
This red scare is used to mobilise the Muslim masses. The sexual moral 
panic of young castrating Gerwani girls is one tactic to do so. And when nobody 
can be reasonably stirred up by the fantasy of such girls given the fact that 
Gerwani has been banned since 1966, the just as frightening but real bodies 
of LGBT persons are used. This is the second sexual moral panic, sweeping 
the country from late 2015 onwards. And, conveniently, rights defenders 
attempt to defend sexual minorities as well (as they do for Muslim victims 
of violence, members of religious minorities, victims of forced evictions and 
other forms of exploitation of the poor and defenceless). Banners appeared 
in several places which read that a particular local or religious organisation 
opposed both communists and LGBT persons. Several persons prominently 
visible in the YLBHI attack, such as Rahmat Himran and Fahira Idris, also 
feature in this homophobic campaign.35 The same groups which demonstrate 
against LGBT groups were trying to destroy the YLBHI building.
Victimisation is another tactic. Though Muslims were in the majority 
during this attack on the YLBHI building, a list of possible topics for the 
new film was circulated on social media, which included more than 10 
examples of alleged PKI cruelty, mostly incidents from around 1945. This 
was indeed a bloody period in Indonesian history, in which various groups 
struggled to impose their interpretation of what should typify the nation state. 
Characteristically, violent acts of Muslim groups perpetrated on their socialist 
adversaries, such as those that occurred during the long drawn-out and bloody 
Darul Islam rebellion (in which mosques were also burned in villages that did 
not support this movement) are ignored.36 
During the raid on the YLBHI this form of victimisation came with 
a reversal of the truth. On social media the violent demonstrators asked 
indignantly ‘why are the police targeting us? We are not killers such as the 
PKI was in 1965’. These messages suggested that the generals were murdered 
by the PKI, in line with the state-sponsored version, ignoring the fact that 
personnel from the armed forces carried out the killings, and that those killed 
by the G30S group were generals, not Muslim leaders. 
34. See Wieringa (2014) for an analysis of the song Genjer-genjer.
35. See the report by Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Saskia E. Wieringa on the incipient homophobia 
in the country https://www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/CreepingCriminalisation-
eng.pdf
36. See Anderson (2006) on the national revolution and Van Dijk (1981) on the Darul Islam 
Movement.
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Indonesian politics is characterised by a paradox. At the national level 
Islamist parties do not dominate Parliament or government. Yet at the 
subnational level hundreds of regional regulations have been imposed which 
entail the “shariahtisation” of society. These regulations typically target women 
and LGBT groups. They are promulgated by local leaders who vie for the 
Muslim vote, often in areas where Islamist rebellions were waged in the late 
1950s against the national state. Though at present the idea of an Indonesian 
caliphate is openly called for by one organisation alone, the recently banned 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), at the regional level these Muslim leaders have 
managed to impose all kinds of regulations that restrict women’s freedom of 
movement and other rights.37 
The various disaffected groups are easily swayed by populist leaders and they 
are vulnerable to lies on social media. The Gerwani hoax is not the only slander to 
have made a deep political impact. In mid-2017 the Saracen group was dismantled 
after having been paid to spread hoaxes, fake news and hate speech. 
Though the participants in the seminar were investigating past human rights 
violations, the President has so far not condemned neither the constitutional 
rights violations of the participants nor the violence of the mob. Demonstrating 
their power to organise street violence may act as a warning to remind us 
that what happened to Ahok – who is now in jail and has lost his election – 
could happen again.38 In pictures taken during the attack on the YLBHI office, 
several demonstrators wore jackets with the name of the Muslim candidates 
who defeated the once popular incumbent. The Jokowi’s declaration on May 
17, 2017, when he stated that the PKI must be clobbered (gebug), for it might 
raise its head again, was eagerly repeated by the Muslim rabble battering at 
the doors of the YLBHI building.
The army also has its own interests to pursue. First, they want to keep the 
monopoly on their version of the events of 1965-66. In his shrill aggressive 
voice, speaking in the already mentioned television programme of the 
Indonesian lawyers’ Club, Kivlan Zen repeated all the old lies about the murder 
of the generals, the presence of Gerwani women, the eye gouging, the weapons 
the PKI had allegedly stashed. The general called human rights defenders the 
 
 
37. The HTI was banned in mid-July 2017 under the controversial law (following a presidential 
regulation on the same topic) that bans groups that go against Pancasila and the Constitution, 
without any court ruling. http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/10/25/editorial-the-
states-perppu-blank-check.html. This is a return to the authoritarian New Order, when the 
government had the right to ban all groups they disapproved of, be they leftist or rightist.
38. Ironically Budi Yuni, who edited the video which then went viral, has also been convicted – 
to 1.5 years in jail. He had edited out a crucial phrase in Ahok’s speech, so that it seemed Ahok 
had criticised the Quran, instead of those who use the Quran for their own political ends. The 
conviction of Budi Yuni does not entail the release of Ahok.  
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“new PKI,” suggesting the same fate would befall them as had befallen PKI 
members in 1965-66. He is supported by various lawmakers who called for a 
ban on discussions of 1965 as that only would cause frictions in society.39 
Right after the attack on the YLBHI office a call was circulated for a 
“peaceful action” to be held after the Friday prayers at mosques around the 
Parliament. The slogans were “refuse the revival of the PKI” and “eliminate the 
defenders of the PKI.” They were also agitating against the recent Presidential 
Instruction under which the radical Islamist group HTI was banned. The 
action was advertised as the “299 action,” standing for 29 September, just as 
the mass demonstrations against Ahok got the dates when they were held as 
titles. In the end the demonstration was not as large as expected. Some 20,000 
police officers were kept in reserve, ultimately 7,000 of them were deployed. 
The participants, who had been expected to number in the tens of thousands, 
turned out to add up to around 10-15,000. The organisers rallied against the 
revival of the PKI, as in the case of the history seminar in the YLBHI building. 
They also demanded that the certain members of Parliament who they called 
PKI members be purged. So clearly political interests prevailed. 
A prominent speaker was the self-exiled leader of the FPI, Rizieq Shihab, who 
had led the mass demonstrations against Ahok. He had been caught in his own 
trap and had to flee the country. Radical Muslim groups were behind the Anti-
Pornography Law of 2008, in which such a broad definition of pornography was 
coined that the sexting of Rizieq with his own mistress fell under it. When this 
was discovered the police launched an investigation and declared him suspect 
of violating that law. Via a telephone connection from Saudi Arabia he too railed 
against the “new PKI.” His “proof” for this allegation? That the history of the 
PKI (army version) is no longer taught in schools.40  
Interestingly, that day (29/09/2017), Rahmat Himran had gathered a small 
group of his supporters around the well-known statue of a young farmer going 
off to the war for the liberation of Irian Jaya in the early 1960s, as his mother bids 
him farewell. His argument? Usually farmers don’t walk around with rifles cum 
bayonets, so this must represent a member of the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia – 
Peasants Front of Indonesia), the farmers’ association of the PKI. His speech fell 
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Apart from radical Muslim groups and the political and army elite, there 
is a third group interested in keeping the spectre of communism alive. Since 
the PKI, the farmers, and trade unions associated with it have been destroyed, 
capitalist exploitative practices have been able to continue unchecked. 
Protests on labour issues or against the destruction of nature by unscrupulous 
mining companies are quickly suppressed, as the local activist Heri Budiawan 
discovered. His case speaks for itself. He led a demonstration against a gold 
mine that was destroying his native forest in the Banyuwangi area in East Java 
and was arrested. He was charged with “spreading communism,” as apparently 
a banner had been seen in the demonstration with the hammer and sickle logo. 
It was unclear who had put up that banner.42 Only human rights defenders have 
protested against forced evictions, illegal land grabs and violations of labour 
rights. They are often confronted by right wing militias. These thugs, as is 
clearly demonstrated in the film “The Act of Killing” by Joshua Oppenheimer, 
are often paid by rogue capitalists, who are happy to turn them loose on those 
who oppose their own interests. 
Economic interests play out in other ways as well. The 1965-1966 genocide 
not only resulted in an enormous loss of life. Many people also profited 
economically. Properties owned by murdered or imprisoned supporters of 
Soekarno and the PKI were seized. As discussed elsewhere in this volume, 
beneficiaries of the land reform laws in the mid 1960s were deprived of the 
land they had legally acquired.
Finally, this renewed repression of human rights defenders cannot be seen 
as separate from the conclusions of the International People’s Tribunal on 
the crimes against humanity committed in 1965-1966. It decreed that the 
Indonesian state must be held accountable for these crimes, which amount 
to genocide.43 Though the government and the military swept this verdict 
aside, it renewed discussions on this dark period in Indonesian history and 
in April 2016 a seminar was held—organised by the government—in which 
both perpetrators and victims told their versions of the events. For the first 
time, millions of people heard the harrowing stories of genocide survivors. 
The results of this seminar were never released. Following this event, Kivlan 
Zen and his colleagues held a counter seminar in Balai Kartini in early June 
2016, and the social and political climate became increasingly repressive.44 
42. https://www.smh.com.au/world/gold-mine-protester-tried-for-spreading-communism-as-red-
scare-sweeps-indonesia-20171012-gyzqad.html, 12 October 2017. He was ultimately sentenced 
to 10 months, though the offensive banner was never presented at court and he consistently 
denied he had ever made or approved of such a banner www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/.../
communism-article-used-sentence-activist.html
43. See the Final Report of the IPT 1965, 2016, published in 2017: www.tribunal1965.org/en/
final-report-of-the-ipt-1965/
44. They are united in Pepabri (Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata, Association of 
Armed Forces retired officers). This is an influential group of conservative retired generals.
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Conclusion
It is actually no wonder that the majority of the Indonesian population does 
not believe the PKI is being revived. According to the results of a survey in the 
first half of September 2017 by the Saifulmujani Institute, only 12.6 % of the 
population currently believes that the PKI is being restored. The majority of 
that group belongs to the PKS and to Gerindra, the party of Jokowi’s opponent 
in the 2014 elections.45 But it is also clear that certain political groups will 
do all they can to keep the spectre of communism alive. It is a convenient 
bogeyman behind which to hide political machinations.
The lies around the 30 September Movement have been exposed; the 
literature is available for anyone with access to the internet. But these mobs 
and their leaders move in self-referencing circles, in which they only listen 
to hardliner clerics and loud-mouthed generals. In these groups myths, lies, 
hoaxes and slander circulate, while rational analyses of the events discussed are 
relegated to the sidelines. Historians will continue conducting their painstaking 
research into events, knowing they will hardly counter the hoaxes. Presenting 
data in the media for a general audience would however be a useful contribution.
This violent episode may mark the start of the 2019 presidential campaign. 
And it may become even rowdier than the anti-Ahok campaign.46 The spectre 
of communism will be used again and again by those who feel their interests 
are served by it. Even by the President himself. His comment on October 1, 
2017, “don’t let the PKI cruelty happen again,” seems to suggest he believes 
the version of events presented by the film “Betrayal of the G30S/PKI.”47 
Historical discussions in Indonesia may become even more toxic indeed.
45. Saifulmujani, research and consulting company. Isu kebangkitan PKI; sebuah penilaian 
publik nasional; temuan survei September 2017.
46. See for instance  https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-did-indonesias-anti-ahok-reunion-
rally-reveal/
47. http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/10/01/09403511/jokowi-jangan-sampai-kekejaman-pki-
terulang-lagi. He even posted this sentence on his facebook page; https://m.facebook.com/story.
php?story_fbid=768582436663941&id=390581294464059
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Abbreviations
BTI: Barisan Tani Indonesia (Peasants Front of Indonesia)
CGMI: Concentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (United Movement of Indonesian 
Students)
FBR: Forum Betawi Rempug (Betawi Brotherhood Forum)
FPI: Forum Pembela Islam (Islam Defenders’ Front)
Gerindra: Gerakan Indonesian Raya (Great Indonesian Movement)
Gerwani: Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women Movement)
G30S: Geraka 30 September (30 September Movement)
GP Ansor: Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (Ansor Youth Movement) 
HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Association of Muslim Students) 
HTI: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
JIAD: Jaringan Islam Anti Diskriminasi (Muslim Anti-Discrimination Network) 
KOKAM: Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda (Resilience Command of the Youth)
LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama
PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
Papebri: Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata (Association of Armed Forces 
Retired Officers)
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKS: Partai Keadilan Sosial (Social Justice Party) 
PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students’ Organisation)
YLBHI: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation).
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